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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ; 
v. ] 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC., ] 
Defendants/Appellees. 
I Case No. 990659 
i Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES RON DREITZLER AND 
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, INC. 
Appeal from the Judgments of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding, 
District Court Case No. 98-0900524 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas D. Harrison (Harrison) asserts in 
his brief that this case presents three (3) issues for review. 
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See Appellant's Brief at 4-6. Unfortunately, Harrison has not 
framed the issues with any precision or clarity but 
simplistically poses questions that challenge the trial court's 
decisions in a general fashion.1 Defendants/Appellees Ron 
Dreitzler (Dreitzler) and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., 
(Werner's) can glean no arguments from Harrison's Brief directly 
relating or cohesively analyzing the issues identified by 
Harrison. After re-reading Harrison's Brief several times, 
counsel for Dreitzler and Werner's believe Harrison's issues on 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Harrison's 
First, Second and Third Causes of Action against Werner's should 
be dismissed because Harrison never "traded" the 1987 Mercedes to 
1. The issues identified by Harrison in his Brief, at page 
4-5, are: 
(1 of 3). Whether the Court's determination 
that there is no genuine issue of a material 
fact in this case is correct. 
(2 of 3). Whether Appellees are entitled to 
jeopardize Appellant's Rights of Due Process, 
by filing with the Trial Court only one page 
of Appellant's deposition, dated May 13, 
1998, (R., p.314), which page was 
demonstrated to be out of context with the 
remainder of said deposition on the point of 
whether the '87 Mercedes was a trade-in (See 
Page 18 of this Brief, hereto). 
(3 of 3). Whether Appellees are entitled to 
"judgment as a matter of law." 
2 
Werner's? 
Standard of review; Entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law with no deference accorded to the trial court's 
determination of the issues presented. The standard of review is 
one of correctness. However, this Court may affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds available to the 
trial court, even if it was not relied on below. See, e.g., 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine Harrison's 
Fourth Cause of Action against Dreitzler for breach of an alleged 
oral indemnification agreement was barred by the statute of 
frauds? 
Standard of review; Entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law, and no deference is due the trial court's 
determination of the issues presented. The standard of review is 
one of correctness. However, this Court may affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds available to the 
trial court, even if it was not relied on below. See, e.g., 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
3. Were Harrison's due process rights violated by 
Werner's' counsel filing only a portion of the transcript of 
3 
Harrison's deposition with the trial court?2 
Standard of review; This issue is a question of law and the 
standard of review is one of correctness. However, this Court 
may affirm the trail court's grant of summary judgment on any 
grounds available to the trial court, even if it was not relied 
on below. See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following rules will be determinative 
of this case: 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) - Use of Depositions in 
Court Proceedings. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 - Summary Judgment. 
3. Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-502 - Discovery 
Procedures in Civil Cases. 
4. Utah R. App. P. 9 - Docketing Statement. 
5. Utah R. App. P. 24 - Briefs. 
2. As discussed hereinbelow, Dreitzler and Werner's assert 
this issue was not properly preserved below and should not be 
considered on appeal. For clarity and the convenience of the 
Court, however, the issue and standard of review are presented. 
Further, because the portions of the deposition transcript in 
question relate only to the trade-in issue asserted against 
Werner's, this issue is inapplicable to Dreitzler. 
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Complete text of the above-referenced rules is provided in 
Addendum A. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. On January 16, 1998, Harrison filed his Complaint 
asserting that he and Dreitzler entered into an oral 
indemnification agreement whereby Dreitzler would repay a 
$14,182.24 loan that was obtained by Harrison from Draper Bank. 
Harrison acknowledged in his Complaint, at paragraph 5, that the 
loan with Draper Bank was in his own name. (R. 1-6). 
2. On June 19, 1998, Harrison was granted leave to file 
his Amended Complaint in which he asserted four (4) causes of 
action. (R. 278-51). The initial three (3) causes of action were 
asserted solely against Werner's: 
a. Harrison's first cause of action (denominated as 
"First Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for 
overpayment, based upon his alleged trade-in of the 1987 Mercedes 
(R. 228-30); 
b. Harrison's second cause of action (i.e., the "Second 
Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for money had 
and received, which is again based upon his alleged trade-in of 
the 1987 Mercedes (R. 230); 
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c. Harrison's third cause of action (i.e., the "Third 
Claim" in his Amended Complaint) alleges a claim for overpayment, 
based upon an "accounting" prepared by Harrison in which he 
asserts the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's (R. 230-31, 
251). 
d. Harrison's Amended Complaint included a "Fourth 
Claim" against Dreitzler in which he incorporated by reference 
the allegations set forth in the original complaint regarding the 
purported oral indemnification agreement and further asserts the 
oral indemnification agreement is not within the statue of frauds 
under the doctrine of part performance. (R. 231). 
3. On June 23, 1998, Dreitzler and Werner's answered 
Harrison's Amended Complaint and Werner's asserted a counterclaim 
against Harrison for unpaid sales taxes owing to Werner's. (R. 
256-64). 
4. On June 25, 1998, Harrison filed a reply to the 
counterclaim asserted by Werner's. (R. 287-88). 
5. On August 7, 1998, Judge Anne M. Stirba entered a 
Scheduling Order establishing a Motion cut-off date of August 28, 
1998, and setting oral argument regarding all pending Motions for 
October 1, 1998. (R. 332-34). 
6. On August 28, 1998, both Dreitzler and Werner's timely 
filed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all 
6 
claims contained in Harrison's Amended Complaint• (Motion and 
Memorandum for Defendant Dreitzler, R. 345-68; Motion and 
Memorandum for Defendant Werner's, R. 369-402). Dreitzler sought 
dismissal because any alleged oral indemnification agreement was 
barred under the statute of frauds provisions contained in U.C.A. 
25-5-4(1)&(2) (1998). Werner's sought dismissal on the grounds 
that the 1987 Mercedes was not traded to Werner's but was owned, 
at all times, by Harrison. 
7. On September 8, 1998, Harrison filed his Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant 
Dreitzler (R. 410-32) and Defendant Werner's (R. 440-56). 
Harrison asserted a disputed issue of fact existed by virtue of 
Harrison filing an Affidavit that contradicted his sworn 
deposition testimony. 
8. On September 16, 1998, Dreitzler (R. 466-87) 
and Werner's (R. 460-65) filed their Reply Memoranda asserting 
that Harrison could not (through a self-serving affidavit) create 
a disputed issue of fact. 
9. On October 1, 1998, Judge Tyrone E. Medley,3 heard oral 
argument on all pending Motions, including Dreitzler's and 
Werner's motions for summary judgment, and took those motions 
3. Due to illness, Judge Stirba was unable to hear oral 
argument. Judge Medley, without objection, heard oral argument 
and, sua sponte, reassigned this case to himself. See R. 652. 
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under advisement. (R. 506). 
10. On October 29, 1998, Judge Medley issued his Minute 
Entry granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment and 
directing Defendants* counsel to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an oirder for the court's signature. (R. 
571-72). A copy of Judge Medley's Minute Entry is set forth in 
Addendum C. 
11. On February 22, 1999, Judge Medley signed and entered 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Order granting 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment that resulted from the 
oral argument of October 1, 1998, and the Minute Entry dated 
October 29, 1998. (R. 713-21). A copy of the Findings and Order 
are set forth, collectively, in Addendum D. 
12. On February 25, 1999, Dreitzler/Werners' counsel filed 
and served upon Harrison's counsel a Notice of Entry of the 
Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
Denying Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees, and 
Denying Plaintiff's Motions in Limine. (R. 723-27). 
13. On March 3, 1999, Werner's filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on its counterclaim, seeking a summary judgment 
in the sum of $878.16 for unpaid sales taxes owed by Harrison. 
(R. 729-36). 
14. On March 13, 1999, Harrison filed his Memorandum in 
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Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 737-
47). 
15. On March 17, 1999, and before a final order had been 
entered as to all claims between the parties, Harrison improperly 
filed a Notice of Appeal seeking appellate review by the Utah 
Supreme Court. (R. 748-49). That appeal was assigned case number 
99-0255 SC (R. 765-66), and was subsequently dismissed by the 
Utah Supreme Court (R. 790) pursuant to a stipulation whereby 
Harrison paid Dreitzler and Werner's their attorney's fees in the 
sum of $728.68 that resulted from that improper appeal. A copy 
of that stipulation is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
16. On March 18, 1999, Defendant Werner's filed its Reply 
Memorandum in further support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Counterclaim. (R. 758-62). 
17. On April 29, 1999, Judge Medley issued his Minute Entry 
granting Defendant Werner's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Counterclaim and again instructing counsel for Defendant to 
prepare "Findings, Conclusions and an Order." (R. 782-84). A 
copy of Judge Medley's Minute Entry is set forth in Addendum E. 
18. On July 14, 1999, Judge Medley executed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Defendant Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and the Order Granting Defendant Werner's 
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Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying 
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees, and Judgment in Favor of 
Werner's and Against Harrison in the sum of $728.68. (R. 795-
802). That Judgment was entered on July 21, 1999. (R. 800). 
Copies of the Findings and Order are set forth, collectively, in 
Addendum G. 
19. On July 26, 1999, Harrison filed his second Notice of 
Appeal again seeking appellate review by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(R. 809). 
20. On August 3, 1999, Plaintiff filed his Docketing 
Statement in which Harrison asserted he was appealing only the 
trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of Werner's on 
its counterclaim. A copy of the Docketing Statement is set forth 
at Addendum H. 
21. On August 25, 1999, this Appeal was transferred to the 
Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 824). 
22. On August 30, 1999, Plaintiff filed his Amended 
Docketing Statement asserting that he also intended to appeal the 
grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against Werner's 
and Dreitzler. A copy of the Amended Docketing Statement is set 
forth at Addendum I. 
23. On December 22, 1999, Appellant filed his brief in this 
Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1997, Harrison contacted Dreitzler about 
purchasing a 1991 Mercedes SDL that was for sale by Werner's. 
(R. 131). Harrison initially proposed to trade two (2) vehicles 
he owned to Werner's: a 1987 Mercedes 300 SDL and a 1989 Dodge 
Caravan. (R. 131). When Dreitzler examined the 1987 Mercedes, 
he determined that he was unwilling to take the 1987 Mercedes as 
a trade-in because of the high mileage. (R. 132). Dreitzler 
then informed Harrison that Harrison would have to arrange his 
own financing for the 1991 Mercedes. (R. 132). 
Harrison then obtained financing for the 1991 Mercedes 
through Draper Bank and Trust (Draper Bank). (R. 235-46). 
Neither Werner's nor Dreitzler were parties or signatories to the 
financing agreement with Draper Bank. (R. 23-46). The Draper 
Bank loan was secured by the 1991 Mercedes purchased by Harrison 
as well as the 1987 Mercedes already owned by Harrison. (R. 
239). Incident to the Draper Bank loan, Harrison signed a Power 
of Attorney in which he averred to Draper Bank that he was the 
"bona fide registered owner" of the 1987 Mercedes. (R. 243). 
After Harrison obtained a loan from Draper Bank to purchase 
the 1991 Mercedes, Dreitzler, on behalf of Werner's, identified 
the 1987 Mercedes as a "trade-in" on the Motor Vehicles Contract 
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of Sale (Sales Agreement) so as to accommodate Harrison's 
attempts to sell his 1987 Mercedes. (R. 132, 139-40). A copy of 
the Sales Agreement is set forth in Addendum B. Specifically, 
the reporting requirements for sales taxes do not require 
reporting the sales taxes due on a trade-in until after three (3) 
months from the date of the trade-in. By identifying the 1987 
Mercedes as a trade-in, Harrison would thus gain the benefit of 
this three (3) month reporting period and could sell the 1987 
Mercedes so as to pay the Draper Bank loan. Further, Harrison 
would avoid paying the sales taxes to the 1987 Mercedes because 
those taxes would be owed by the prospective purchaser. (R. 
133). 
Harrison admitted (in his deposition testimony) that the 
written Sales Agreement, however, did not represent the entire 
agreement of the parties. (R. 373-74, 382). As of today's date, 
the title to the 1987 Mercedes has never been transferred to 
Werner's as would have been required for the vehicle to be traded 
to Werner's. (R. 374-75, 383). In fact, Draper Bank's loan 
officer, one Patty Householder, acknowledged in her deposition 
that Draper Bank did not view either Dreitzler or Werner's as 
owning the 1987 Mercedes. (R. 298, 319). 
On October 31, 1997, nearly three (3) months after Harrison 
claims the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's, Harrison entered 
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into a modification agreement with Draper Bank concerning his 
loan. (R. 247-50). The modification was to provide for monthly 
payments but the loan remained secured, however, by both the 1991 
Mercedes and the 1987 Mercedes. (R. 250). Draper Bank did not 
require Werner's or Dreitzler to sign or guarantee payment of the 
loan because neither owned the vehicle. (R. 247-250). 
In December, 1997, Dreitzler first discovered that Harrison 
had never had the 1987 Mercedes titled in Harrison's name. (R. 
139). As a result, Dreitzler then informed Harrison that 
Werner's would no longer accommodate Harrison in his efforts to 
attempt to sell the 1987 Mercedes on Werner's lot and Dreitzler 
delivered the vehicle to Draper Bank as lien holder. (R. 139-
40). 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly determined that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and that Dreitzler and Werner's 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this appeal, 
Harrison claims there is a genuine and disputed issue of material 
fact concerning whether his 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's. 
All of the evidence before the trial court, including Harrison's 
own deposition testimony, was that the 1987 Mercedes was never 
traded by Harrison to Werner's because title never passed to 
13 
Werner's. Harrison's own deposition testimony, in fact, was that 
the title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to Werner's 
as it would have been had the vehicle actually been traded to 
Werner's. The only evidence to the contrary were Harrison's 
self-serving affidavits, filed after he understood the affect of 
his deposition testimony, in which he boldly asserted that the 
1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's. As a matter of law, 
Harrison's affidavits are insufficient to contradict his 
deposition testimony and he cannot use his own inconsistent 
testimony to "create" a disputed issue of material fact. 
Harrison's due process arguments are non-meritorious for 
several reasons. First, Harrison never made this argument before 
the trial court. Second, Harrison failed to preserve the issue 
on appeal. The issue was not included in either his Docketing 
Statement or his Amended Docketing Statement. Third, Harrison 
has not cited any legal precedent supporting his contention that 
Werner's was required to file Harrison's entire deposition 
transcript, or that the failure to do violated his due process 
rights. In fact, Utah law is to the contrary, and if Harrison 
had wanted other portions of his deposition testimony before the 
trail court, he had every opportunity to present them. 
Finally, Harrison's brief is inadequate under Rule 24 and 
his failure to provide this Court with any reasonable means to 
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review the trial court's orders should result in those orders 
being affirmed with an award of attorney's fees to Dreitzler and 
Werner's on appeal, Harrison has presented no legal authority or 
analysis whatsoever in support of either his due process claim or 
his oral indemnification claim. As to the "trade-in" issue, 
Harrison has provided five (5) pages of quotations from Utah 
cases without any analysis of the law included therein or any 
application of the law to the facts of this case. Simply stated, 
Harrison's brief does not present any thoughtful or rational 
arguments that can be responded to in any fashion and his Brief 
should be wholly disregarded. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND 
THAT WERNER'S WAS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A, Harrison Never Traded the 1987 Mercedes to Werner's. 
In dismissing Harrison's First, Second and Third Causes of 
Action against Werner's, the trial court correctly determined 
that the 1987 Mercedes had never, as a matter of law, been traded 
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to Werner's,4 Even though Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact, 
he did not thereby create a genuine issue as to any material fact 
in so doing.5 A review of the proceedings demonstrates Judge 
Medley's ruling is supported by the record. 
First, Harrison's own deposition testimony was 
that a transfer of title was necessary to effect a change in 
ownership of a vehicle and Harrison acknowledged that he never 
transferred title to the 1987 Mercedes to Werner's. (R. 374-75). 
Second, Harrison's actions after the date he claims the 1987 
4. The specific Conclusion of Law Harrison appears to be 
challenging on appeal is found at R. 718. 
5. At oral argument, Harrison's counsel objected to the 
trial court's decision to prepare findings of fact and conclusion 
of law. (R. 833 at page 4, lines 13-17). In response, the trial 
court noted that it is often "necessary to come to some decision 
regarding the facts, especially in terms of whether or not 
genuine issues of material fact have been established." (R. 823 
at page 5, lines 1-4). Although Harrison's brief does not appear 
to have raised this issue, Dreitzler and Werner's point out that 
the trial court did not err in this regard: Rule 52(a) provides 
that findings of fact are not required in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, but a trial court's decision to do so is not 
necessarily error. See, e.g., Salt Lake County Commission v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902-03 (Utah 1999) 
(noting that trial court's decision to prepare finding of fact 
and conclusions of law in ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
was not error). Findings of Fact are only inappropriate in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the contents of 
those findings of fact "evidence the existence of material issues 
of fact." Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). In this case, 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and were designed to simplify. 
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Mercedes was traded demonstrate that he always remained the 
owner: nearly three (3) months after the alleged "trade-in," 
Harrison entered into a Change in Terms Agreement with Draper 
Bank on his loan that was secured by the 1987 Mercedes he claims 
was traded to Werner's (R. 397-98). Third, Harrison executed a 
Power of Attorney averring he was the "bona fide" owner of the 
1987 Mercedes. (R. 243). Fourth, Ms. Householder with Draper 
Bank acknowledged that Draper Bank viewed Harrison (at all times) 
as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes. (R. 298). The record 
evidence is thus overwhelming that the 1987 Mercedes was never 
traded to Werner's. Instead, Harrison remained its owner at all 
times. 
The only potential support in the record for Harrison's 
position is as follows: 
First, the 1987 Mercedes was identified in the Sales 
Agreement under the heading "Trade-In and/or Other Credits," (R. 
6). It is conceded by Harrison, however, that the Sales 
Agreement did not represent the parties' complete agreement, and 
the trial court therefore properly examined other evidence to 
determine the parties' agreement (R. 373-74, 382; R. 716, 718). 
Appellant's brief does not appear to challenge or dispute this 
issue on appeal. 
Second, the only other evidence in the record that 
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the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's are the multiple, self-
serving affidavits of Harrison in which he simply asserts the 
1987 Mercedes was a "trade-in." (See R. 412, 441, and 443). 
Harrison cannot, however, as a matter of law, use his own 
affidavit to contradict his own sworn deposition testimony and 
thereby create a "genuine issue of material fact" so as to defeat 
Werner's motions for summary judgment: 
[W]hen a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition, that is not modified on cross-
examination, he may not thereafter raise an 
issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition, unless he can 
provide an explanation of the discrepancy. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). No 
explanation has ever been offered by Harrison reconciling his 
deposition testimony and his contradictory affidavits. Without 
such explanation, Harrison's affidavits were correctly rejected 
by the trial court. See R. 447, R. 832 at page 26, line 7, to 
page 27, line 2.6 The trial court thus correctly determined the 
1987 Mercedes had never been traded to Werner's and the trial 
6. Harrison has failed to provide this Court with a 
complete transcript regarding the alleged "factual" dispute. The 
portions of the transcript Harrison did provide, however, make it 
clear that Harrison's counsel did not make any argument the trial 
court found persuasive (See R. 832 at page 27, line 3, to page 
30, line 6), because counsel even agreed with Judge Medley that 
the face of the Sales Agreement was the only evidence before the 
trial court in support of Harrison's position. See R. 832 at 
page 30, lines 4-6. 
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court's orders should be affirmed. 
B. Because There Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact, 
Werner's Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
On appeal, Harrison has only argued that there is one 
genuine issue of material fact: whether the 1987 Mercedes was 
traded to Werner's. Harrison's brief thus implicitly concedes, 
by providing no argument or analysis of the issue, that Werner's 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the trade-in issue 
is resolved in Werner's favor. Moreover, Harrison was left with 
no choice but to concede this position: if the 1987 Mercedes was 
never traded to Werner's but remained Harrison's property at all 
times, there is no legal basis for Harrison to argue that 
Werner's should repay a loan in Harrison's name and which is 
secured by two (2) vehicles owned by Harrison. 
Because Harrison has provided this Court with no legal or 
factual basis for reversing the trial court's decision, the trial 
court's decision must be affirmed once this Court determines that 
the trial court correctly determined no genuine issue as to any 
material fact existed regarding the alleged trade-in of the 1987 
Mercedes. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
HARRISON'S ORAL INDEMNIFICATION 
CLAIM AGAINST DREITZLER BECAUSE THE 
SAME IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS 
In granting Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court concluded that Harrison's oral indemnification claim 
against Dreitzler was barred by the Statute of Frauds, to-wit: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary 
Judgment: 
1. Plaintifffs claim alleging an oral 
agreement to indemnify is barred by the 
statue of frauds. Specifically, the claim is 
barred by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1998), 
which applies to any "promise to answer for 
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another" 
and by § 25-5-4(1) (1998), which applies to 
"every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year." Further, 
plaintiff's claim is not taken out of the 
statute of frauds by any part performance for 
two reasons. First, the part performance 
doctrine is only available where the statute 
of frauds is asserted as a defense in a 
specific performance action involving real 
property or unique personality. Second, even 
if the doctrine of part performance were 
available to plaintiff, plaintiff has not 
provided the Court with clear and convincing 
evidence showing that any alleged part 
performance is exclusively referable to the 
alleged oral agreement. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Defendants' Motions 
for Summary Judgment at R. 717. See Addendum D. 
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In his Brief on appeal, Harrison has not specifically 
challenged the Court's conclusion with any argument demonstrating 
that the alleged "oral indemnification" claim is taken out of the 
statute of frauds by part performance or otherwise. Further, 
Harrison has even failed to cite the applicable statutory 
provisions governing this issue and has cited no legal authority 
that would justify reversal of the trial court's determination. 
Absent any facts or law upon which this Court can perform a 
rudimentary analysis of Harrison's claims, this Court is 
therefore obligated to affirm the trial court's granting of 
summary judgement in favor of Dreitzler. See Smith v. Smith, 
1999 UT App 370, 1 10, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. 
III. 
HARRISON'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF HIS 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
A. Harrison Failed to Preserve this Issue for Appeal. 
In his brief, Harrison includes a subsection identifying 
where the record allegedly shows that issues were preserved in 
the trial court. As to the due process issue, however, Harrison 
cites to "Pages 13-21 of this Brief, hereto," conceding that the 
issue was not, in fact, preserved for appeal in the trial court. 
See Appellant's Brief at 6. In fact, the opposite is true: 
Harrison had several opportunities to raise this issue at the 
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trial court and chose not to do so. 
On August 28, 1998, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., filed 
its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 369-71) and the supporting 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 372-402). In the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Werner's quoted Harrison's 
deposition testimony that the vehicle in question had not been 
traded to Werner's (R. 374-75) and provided the Court with the 
relevant portion of the deposition transcript (R. 383). 
Harrison filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Werner's 
Mercedes Repair, Inc., on September 8, 1998 (R. 440-56). In that 
Memorandum, Harrison argued that the vehicle was, in fact, traded 
to Werner's but did not dispute Werner's presentation of the 
deposition testimony; he did not object or present the trial 
court with additional portions of his deposition testimony; and 
he did not argue that additional portions of his testimony should 
be considered.7 
Harrison also failed to preserve the issue at oral argument 
on Werner's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 1, 1998. 
Although Harrison only provided this Court with a partial 
7. It should be noted that in a different memorandum filed 
the same day, Harrison quoted from a different portion of the 
deposition in question (R. 415). Harrison's reliance on other 
parts of his deposition constitutes a waiver of any objection he 
could have asserted below. 
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transcript (R. 832) ,8 that transcript reflects the fact that the 
trial court read the relevant deposition testimony aloud to 
Harrison's counsel (R. 832 at page 29, line 6-13), and then 
offered Harrison's counsel the opportunity to respond (R. 832 on 
page 29, line 14 to page 36, line 8). Harrison's counsel's 
failure to object or present other portions of Harrison's 
deposition precludes consideration of that issue on appeal. 
Finally, Harrison failed to present the due process issue in 
his Amended Docketing Statement or in his original Docketing 
Statement as required by Rule 9(c)(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Because Harrison failed to preserve his due process issue 
for appeal, this Court should deny any relief on his claims for 
violation of the same. 
B. Even if Harrison had Preserved the Due Process 
Argument for Appeal, There was No Violation of Harrison's Due 
Process Rights. 
Harrison has cited no legal authority in support of his 
assertions that Dreitzler and Werner's were required to file the 
entire deposition transcript with the trial court and that the 
failure to do so violated his due process rights. In fact, the 
relevant legal authorities are to the contrary. 
8. "Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to 
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant 
portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
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Specifically, Rule 4-502(4) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration provided that: 
Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the 
clerk of the court except as provided in this 
Code or upon order of the court for good 
cause shown• (emphasis supplied).9 
Further, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: 
If only part of a deposition is offered in 
evidence by a party/ an adverse party may 
require him to introduce any other part which 
ought in fairness to be considered with the 
part introduced, and any party may introduce 
any other parts. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4). (emphasis supplied). 
As shown above, the applicable rules contemplate that only a 
portion of deposition testimony may be presented to the trial 
court and an adverse party may then respond by providing 
additional transcripts pages as may be necessary for that party 
to defend his/her position. As has been detailed hereinabove, 
Harrison had the opportunity to put additional portions of the 
deposition before the trial court and failed to do so.10 
9. Although Rule 4-502 was repealed effective November 1, 
1999, it was in effect at all times relevant herein. 
10. Harrison's position seems to be, much like his brief on 
appeal, that the trial court had an obligation to scour the 
record for information and analysis that supported Harrison's 
bare, unsupported assertions: "Had Judge Medley read the entire 
deposition, which of course, Appellant believed he had, and was 
also his right to expect that he had . . . ." Harrison cites no 
source for this "right." Given Harrison's failure to present 
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Because Harrison cannot demonstrate that Dreitzler and 
Werner's failed to comply with any legal requirement, or that 
Harrison had any due process right that was violated, this issue 
is not well taken and the orders of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
IV. 
HARRISON'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE 
UNDER RULE 24 AND HARRISON HAS 
FAILED TO PROVIDE THIS COURT WITH 
ANY MEANS TO REVIEW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDERS 
A, Harrison's Brief Fails to Satisfy the Minimal 
Requirements of Rule 24. 
Rule 2 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that briefs "contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal 
authority." Smith v. Smith 1999 UT App. 370, 18, 384 Utah Adv. 
30 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(j) and State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 304-05 (Utah 1998)). When an appellant fails to present an 
adequate brief, the trial court's decisions will be affirmed. 
See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App. 370, 18, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. 
Utah's appellate courts have refused to consider issues on appeal 
where parties' arguments have failed to cite any legal authority 
(See Id. at 110) or have failed to apply general legal authority 
additional deposition testimony to the trial court - or even to 
argue that it might be relevant - it appears that Harrison 
expected the trial court to develop his arguments below in much 
the same way his brief places that burden on this Court. 
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to the facts of a case (See Id, at 111 and Thomas, 961 P.2d at 
305) • 
Under the standards developed by Utah's Appellate Courts 
applying Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Harrison's brief is wholly inadequate. In support of Harrison's 
due process argument, Harrison provides no legal authority or 
analysis but only states that: 
The Law, regarding due process and every 
citizen's right thereto, is so self-evident 
that no citations of authority are deemed 
necessary in its application to this case. 
(Appellant's Brief at 26). In so doing, Harrison has 
impermissibly shifted "the burden of argument and research" onto 
the Court. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (quoting State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1998) (with Bishop quoting Williamson v. 
Opsehl, 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (1981)). 
In the same vein, Appellant's Brief devotes a great deal of 
discussion to issues surrounding the transcript of Plaintiff's 
deposition. In that discussion, however, Harrison cites to no 
legal authority whatsoever and fails to provide the Court with 
any legal basis to review the trial court's decision. 
With regard to the legal standards applicable to motions for 
summary judgment, Appellant's brief includes nearly five (5) 
pages of quotations from Utah cases. See Appellant's Brief at 
22-26. Harrison has not, however, provided the Court with any 
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analysis of those cases or with any application of that law to 
the matters at issue in this appeal. "Extensive quotations from 
numerous case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot 
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly 
tied to the record before us," West Valley City v. Majestic 
Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Again, Harrison has impermissibly placed the burden of analysis 
on the Court. 
B. Harrison's Counsel Should be Required to Pay 
Appellee's Attorney's Fees on Appeal, 
Rule 24(j) permits the Court to require Harrison's Counsel 
to pay Appellee's attorney's fees: 
Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Utah R. App. P.2d 24(j)(emphasis supplied). The Court should 
exercise its discretion to do so in this case, particularly in 
light of the extra efforts necessitated by the inadequacies of 
Harrison's brief.11 
11. Further, Dreitzler and Werner's assert that Harrison's 
arguments regarding due process and the deposition transcript, 
presented without any reference to supporting legal authority, 
are frivolous for the purpose of awarding just damages, including 
attorney's fees, under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Under Rule 33(a), attorney's fees may be awarded 
against the party or his attorney. 
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VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of the trial court should be affirmed. Harrison 
has not presented any issue for appeal as to the oral 
indemnification claim against Dreitzler and the trial court 
correctly determined the 1987 Mercedes was never traded by 
Harrison to Werner's. 
Further, Harrison's due process claim was not preserved for 
appeal. Even if it were, Harrison cannot prevail on the merits 
of that claim. Not only has Harrison failed to provide any legal 
authority in support of his due process argument, but the legal 
authorities presented by Dreitzler and Werner's are to the 
contrary. 
Finally, Harrison's brief is woefully inadequate under Rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rules 24(j) 
and 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial 
court's decisions should be affirmed and Dreitzler and Werner's 
should be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this <P3~~ day of /^^-y , 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Phillip W" Dyer 
Kevin C. Timken 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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19 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 32 
He amendtficnts directed that the new proce-
ss be applicable only to cases filed on or 
^November 1, 1999.' 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . 
ment rewrote this ru\c. 
— The 1999 amend-
R i \1. Depositions upon written questions. 
(a) 9 k m g questions; notice. 
(1) A ^ ^ : t y may take the testimony of any person, including a party, byj 
deposi t io^Mpn written questions without leave of court except as provided j | 
p a r a g r a p h ^ ^ T h e attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the usj 
subpoena a s ^ B ^ i d e d in Rule 45. 
(2) A party I M M obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to thaflBffent 
consistent w i t l r f l ^p r inc ip l e s stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if the p e n d H ^ o be 
examined is connffl^in prison or if, without the written s t ipul j f f l^ of the 
parties, 
(A) a proposed depHJfcon would result in more than ten dgfflKtions being 
taken under this rule a^R^le 30 by the plaintiffs, or by t h ^ j p e n d a n t s , or by 
third-party defendants; 
(B) the person to be exaSJShed has already been depoflBTin the case; or 
(C) a party seeks to take a»8bosition before the tin^gBecified in Rule 26(d). 
(3) A party desiring to t a k e ^ ^ p o s i t i o n upon wrigBrTquestions shall serve 
them upon every other party wi t ra i notice stating^jwxhe name and address of 
the person who is to answer t h e n ^ T k n o w n , ar raar the name is not known, a 
general description sufficient to idesraj^ him Qffl®? particular class or group to 
which he belongs, and (2) the namG§« dejiaffptive title and address of the 
aken. A deposition upon written 
£e corporation or a partnership or 
mce with the provisions of Rule 
officer before whom the deposition is 
questions may be taken of a public or 
association or governmental agency ijj 
30(b)(6). 
(4) Within 14 days after the notjjBShd wri^ffltouestions are served, a party 
may serve cross questions upoiaaHr other paroH^Within 7 days after being 
served with cross quest ions ,^Warty may serve^Mlirect questions upon all 
other parties. Within 7 davs jgHr being served witliWwlirect questions, a party 
may serve recross questiagHTpon all other p a r t i e s . ^ j ^ c o u r t may for cause 
shown enlarge or shortejflBfe time. 
(b) Officer to take rfigfhses and prepare record. A clffl^pf the notice and 
copies of all auest io^Pserved shall be delivered by t n H g a r t y taking the 
deposition to the oJ&Fr designated in the notice, who shalnBByeed promptly, 
in the manner pjmKed by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f), attaching flBBfae deposition 
the copy of ihe^Kice and the questions received. 
(Amended e i j ^ ^ e November 1, 1999.) 
A d v i s o r v ^ H h m i t t e e Note . — For a com-
plete exp^^^Ron of the 1999 amendments to 
this ru]^^ma the interrelationship of these 
xs with the other discovery changes, 
laVisory committee note appended to 
The Supreme Court order approving 
nendments directed that the new proce-
be applicable onlv_ 
ment rewrote the first paragraph^^BKubdivi-
sion (a/ as Subdivisions (a)< 1) and <2n^^ypnat-
ing the following paragraphs as (a)(3^^^L(4); 
in Subdivision (a)(4), substituted "14 daJ^Bfcr 
"30 days" in the first sentence and "7 d a ^ 
"10 days'1 in the second and third senterij 
deleted from Subdivision (b) specific provisiol 
Subdivision (cl 
Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings. 
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an 
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present 
and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented 
Rule 32 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 
at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in 
accordance with any of the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting 
or impeaching the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for any other 
purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the 
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private 
corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency which is a 
party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any 
party for any purpose if the court finds: 
(A) that the witness is dead; or 
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place 
of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the 
absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or 
(C) that the witness is unable to at tend or testify because of age, illness, 
infirmity, or imprisonment; or 
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the 
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 
(E) upon application and notice, tha t such exceptional circumstances exist 
as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the 
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to 
allow the deposition to be used. 
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse 
party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in fairness to 
be considered with the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other 
parts . 
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use 
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any 
court of the United States or of any state and another action involving the 
same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their 
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and 
duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken 
therefor. A deposition previously taken may also be used as permitted by the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(b) Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rule 28(b) and 
Subdivision (c)(3) of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to 
receiving in evidence any deposition or par t thereof for any reason which would 
require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and 
testifying. 
(c) Effect of errors and irregularities. 
(1) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a 
deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the 
party giving the notice. 
(2) As to disqualification of officer. Objection to taking a deposition because 
of disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless 
made before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the 
disqualification becomes known or could be discovered with reasonable dili-
gence. 
(3) As to taking of deposition. 
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, 
relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them 
before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection 
is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that/ t ime. 
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the 
manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the 
oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which 
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might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented are waived unless 
seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition. 
(C) Objections to the form of written questions submitted under Rule 31 are 
waived unless served in writing upon the party propounding them within the 
time allowed for serving the succeeding cross or other questions and within 5 
days after service of the last questions authorized. 
(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and irregularities in 
the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, 
signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with 
by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a motion to suppress the 
deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable promptness after such 
defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained. 
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under Subsection (a) of this 
rule shall have the effect of publishing the deposition unless the court orders 
otherwise in response to objections. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987; April 29, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — For a com-
plete explanation of the 1999 amendments to 
this rule and the interrelationship of these 
amendments with the other discovery 
see the a d v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a e r approving 
the amendments directed that the new proce-
dures be applicable only to cases filed on or 
after November 1, 1999. 
iotes. — The April 1999 
LJC)(3)W for ^ 
"Subdivision (dJC 
^parately and fully in writing 
it the objecting party shall 
extent the interrogatory 
ing them, and the 
Interrogatories to parties. 
(a) AuaTSM^v; procedures for use. Without leave of court^Sj&written 
stipulation, a ^ W f c t y m a v serve upon any other party written iggra^ogatories, 
not exceeding 25H^fember including all discrete subparts, tg^SHinswered by 
the party served or^nHfeaparty served is a public or pr i^^^corpora t ion , a 
partnership, an associatr^gfcr^a governmental agency, b|%sny officer or agent, 
who shall furnish such infonmjfcon as is available toJip^party. Leave to serve 
additional interrogatories shan^H^granted to th^Kj^Bnt consistent with the 
principles of Rule 26(b)(2). WitMHWeave of^jmrt or written stipulation, 
interrogatories may not be served b(%8^he4iJgEspecified in Rule 26(d). 
(b) Answers and objections. 
(1) Each interrogatory shall be answ| 
under oath, unless it is objected to, m$Sfiier 
state the reasons for objection and §&©|ransweri 
is not objectionable. 
(2) The answers are to be jjjjSfted by the persor 
objections signed by the a t t ^ ^ y making them. 
(3) The party upon whrnd^fe interrogatories have been^Sfcjed shall serve a 
copy of the answers anjfe!ewjJections, if any, within 30 days a*Sa£he service of 
the interrogatories. A^aSrrter or longer time may be ordered b^^f^gour t or, in 
the absence of sucljggporder, agreed to in writing by the parties sufflkt to Rule 
29. 
(4) All groujfiSrfor an objection to an interrogatory shall be stalSSfcwith 
specificity. ^ W g r o u n d not stated in a timely objection is waived u n l e s S ^ e 
party's faJffle to object is excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(5) T^Hparty submitting the interrogatories may move for an order unc 
Rulj^Mra) with respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an^ 
inJ^Hogatory. 
Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can 
be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the extent 
permitted by the Rules of Evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely 
because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that 
relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order that 
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Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to 
an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
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159 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
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thereto or served therewith. The court; may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion tha t he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just . 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
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Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Juvenile Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the 
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of 
the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a 
copy of the proof of service affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request 
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding 
to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of 
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of service 
upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and response shall 
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the court on motion and notice 
and for good cause shown so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a discovery request 
or a motion which relies upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discovery request or response which is at issue in the motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be 
filed with the clerk of the court except as provided in this Code or upon order 
of the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accor-
dance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court 
no later than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial shall be 
within the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty 
(30) days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon 
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notice to the other parties in the action. In exercising its discretion, the court 
shall take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the 
diligence or lack of diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether 
permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the 
scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein shall 
preclude or limit the voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no 
event shall such exchanges or stipulations require a court to grant a continu-
ance of the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment deleted provisions relating to circuit 
courts from the applicability paragraph. 
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petition" near the end of Subdivision (b). 
Rule 9. Docketing statement. 
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or 
a petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellant, or petitioner shall 
file a docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original and 
two copies of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court. 
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a brief 
and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is used by the 
appellate court in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of 
Appeals when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme 
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded them, in 
making summary dispositions when appropriate, and in making calendar 
assignments. When a petition for interlocutory review is granted under Rule 5, 
a docketing statement shall not be filed, unless otherwise ordered. 
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall contain 
the following information in the order set forth below: 
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of all 
motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, or Rules 24 or 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a 
statement that no such motions have been filed; the date and effect of all orders 
disposing of such motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for 
review was filed. 
(2)(A) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on 
the appellate court to decide the appeal or the petition for review. 
(B) If an appeal is from an order in a multiple-party or a multiple-claim 
case, and the judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
(i) a statement of what claims and parties remain before the trial court for 
adjudication and 
(ii) a statement of whether the facts underlying the appeal are sufficiently 
similar to the facts underlying the claims remaining before the trial court to 
constitute res judicata on those claims. 
(C) If the case contains a claim for damages, the amount of the claim, 
exclusive of court costs, interests, and attorney fees. 
(3) A concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., "thj& appeal is 
from a final judgment or decree of the court" or "this 
petition is to review an order of administrative agency." 
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(4) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the questions 
presented. 
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and circum-
stances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions should not 
be repetitious. General conclusions such as "the judgment of the trial court is 
not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. For each issue appellant 
must state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting 
authority. 
(6) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals" should 
appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e., "Docketing State-
ment." 
(7) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals, the appellant may set forth concisely in not more than two pages 
why the Supreme Court should decide the case. The Supreme Court may, for 
example, consider whether the case presents or involves one or more of the 
following: 
(A) a substantial constitutional issue not yet decided and, if so, what the 
issue or issues are; 
(B) an issue of first impression in the state and of substantial importance in 
the administration of justice; 
(C) a conflict in Court of Appeals decisions that needs to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court; 
(D) any other persuasive reason why the Supreme Court should resolve the 
issue. 
(8) Citations to statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of the 
respective issues stated. 
(9) A reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the reference is 
to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given. 
(d) Necessary attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing statement 
shall be a copy of the following: 
(1) The final judgment and any other order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) Any opinion or findings; 
(3) All motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), and 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and orders disposing of such motions; and 
(4) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for the filing of a 
notice of appeal. 
(e) Attachment to indicate date filed. The at tachments required by this rule 
mus t bear a clear representation of the original date of filing by means of the 
trial court's filing seal or mark or a copy conformed to the original by the trial 
court. 
(f) Response to statement regarding assignment. If the appeal is subject to 
assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the appellee may 
file a response to the appellant's contentions in subparagraph (c)(7). If 
appellant filed no statement under (c)(7), the appellee may file a s tatement in 
the same form as provided by (c)(7). The response may support or oppose the 
appellant's position. The response or s tatement shall not be more than two 
pages long, and shall be filed within 10 days after service of the docketing 
statement. 
(g) Consequences of failure to comply. Docketing s ta tements which fail to 
comply with this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in 
dismissal of the appeal or the petition. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1996; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment substituted "two copies" for "three copies" 
in the second sentence of Subdivision (a). 
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Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits 
filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared 
by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record 
on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial 
court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the 
record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule 
shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court 
shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the 
following order: 
(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(B) the docket sheet; 
(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and 
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order. 
(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the 
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page 
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series 
of numerals for the entire record. 
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk 
shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental 
record in the same order as the original record and mark the bottom right 
corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only 
of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number 
beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the 
original record. 
(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index 
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or 
transcript was filed in the trial court and the start ing page of the record on 
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties 
in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ 
of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the 
event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with 
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other 
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit 
the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by 
the clerk of the trial court as par t of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmit ted shall consist of 
the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the papers, 
excluding any transcripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be 
transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In 
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, 
simultaneously with the filing of appellants reply brief, notice of the date on 
which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not intend to file a 
reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial court of that feet within 
30 days of the filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, excluding 
any transcripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of 
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the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate 
designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs. Only those 
designated papers and the following, to the extent applicable, shall be 
transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from which the appeal 
is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law filed or 
delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon which the 
court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer than 300 
pages, the agency shall t ransmit all papers to the appellate court. Where all 
papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the parties shall, within 
10 days after briefing is completed, file with the agency a joint or separate 
designation of those papers necessary to the appeal. The agency shall t ransmit 
those designated papers to the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or 
designated papers, the agency may, with the approval of the court, file only the 
chronological index of the record or of such p>arts of the record as the parties 
may designate. All par ts of the record retained by the agency shall be 
considered par t of the record on review for all purposes. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant 
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state tha t the 
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate 
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant 
shall include the request for a compressed format within the request for 
transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the 
same period the appellant shall file a certificate to tha t effect with the clerk of 
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal tha t a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire 
transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the 
notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues tha t will be presented on appeal 
and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy 
of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the 
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service 
of the request or certificate and the s tatement of the appellant, file and serve 
on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 
10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such 
parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 
days either request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring 
the appellant to do so. 
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(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal 
as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a 
statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose 
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the 
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such 
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues 
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial 
court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the 
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the 
index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the 
statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant 
is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant 
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, 
who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. 
The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted 
to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, 
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to 
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial 
court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary 
that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or 
the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a 
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; January 1, 
1998; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- beginning "and shall state" to the end of the 
ment in Subdivision (e)(1) added the language second sentence and made a related change. 
ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, 
COMMITTEES 
Rule 14. Review of^a^^^^^atj^j^waers: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review ofodBjPfiint pe^ taS^HtaJud ic i a l review by the 
Supreme Court or thejGgH^TAppeals is providecrflKfejiite of an order or 
decision of an admLjja|^ive agency, board, commission^^Wfefctee. or officer 
(hereinafter t h ^ H H i "agency" shall include agency, boaSHfegmission, 
committee^BPrcer), a petition for review shall be filed with t h e c S H h ^ h e 
a p p e l l ^ j p f f t within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is n? 
prg^jBmTthen within 30 days after the date of the written decision or ord 
letition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the 
!Spondent(s) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
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the clerk. Filing shall not be timely unless the papers are received by the clerly 
Atihin the time fixed for filing, except that briefs shall be deemed filed o n t l f l 
cR^^f the postmark if first class mail is utilized. If a motion requestsjdjK 
whiSMnay be granted by a single justice or judge, the justice or jud^BP^ay 
accep^J^motion, note the date of filing, and transmit it to the ClgBr 
(b) Se^fcfco/* all papers required. Copies of all papers fi^Bwith the 
appellate ^ M t shall, at or before the time of filing, be ser^JBRi all other 
parties to the^Bteal or review. Service on a party representgap? counsel shall 
be made on couinLpf record, or, if the party is not rea|j^Bnted by counsel, 
upon the party at^WBklast known address. A copy (^BBTpaper required by 
these rules to be s^Md on a party shall byflHF with the court and 
accompanied by proof of^Htorice. jt^r 
(c) Manner of service, ^ j s k e may be p e r ^ H r o r by mail. Personal service 
includes delivery of the copy^wgclerk orjljflrresponsible person at the office 
of counsel. Service by mail is c^S^ te | [^Ra i l ing . 
(d) Proof of service. Papers^SMpited for filing shall contain an 
acknowledgement of service by ^ B ^ S S £ served or a certificate of service in 
the form of a statement of thaflH£ anera&nner of service, the names of the 
persons served, and the a d ^ B ^ s at whicB^m^were served. The certificate of 
service may appear on ^ j ^ ^ m x e d to the p^MsJiled. If counsel of record is 
served, the certifica^Br service shall designra^the name of the party 
represented by th^HKise l . ^K&k. 
(e) SigTiatar^^rpapers filed in the appellate (SSfeyshall be signed by 
counsel of rea^^^r by a party who is not representedl/jHtansel. 
(Amended^HRive October 1, 1992; November 1, 1 9 9 9 . ) ^ M ^ 
Am^Hnent Notes. — The 1999 amend- late court" for "Briefs, petitions^l^Bfc, certif-
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
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follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and,.each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
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reference-shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999.) 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 3 
481 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 33 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Jtah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
ah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals. 
ld^Bfeh L. Rev. 150. 
Rule iterest on judgment. 
Unless othe^^^torovided by law, if a ^ ^ H ^ n t for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatevS^fcwjest is a l low^^BRw shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was enW^fci iLth^^^^ourt . 
,REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Apt |^Mrerror § 995" 
A.L.R. — Date fr^^^HRTinterest on judg-
ment starts runj^^Mre affected by modifica-
tion of amj^^P^judgment on appeal, 4 
A.L.R.3J 
Rij 
Js^  of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411. 
7
 interest on judgment where both 
parties^^^^^^L.R.4th 1099. 
Retrospect^^^fcfcafipn and effect of state 
statute or rule ailW^^^^terest or changing 
jucuffl^^^^iiardicts, 41 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, 
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the 
damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the 
appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall 
issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why 
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth 
the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten 
days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
to make express the authority of the court to 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
ADDENDUM B 
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale 
dated August 1, 1997 
SELLER/ DEALER: MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE t> 
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR 
MERCEDES BENZ SPECIALIST 
3113 SO. WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
(801) 467-8220 
. _ , , / ^ , / DATE OF SALE 
rvmcruscrrs NAMC 
sr*t f T Aooness 
/ -W/r &/« . SU. ZkLZ. 
CITY / 
IS 
-JUL 4-fli 
(I w 
•1 7 - 7<tV/ 
Purchaser ind Co- Purchaser^, (f any. (hereafter r«tafr«d to a« -Purch«««f 1 hereby agree to purchase the following vehicle from Seller / Oealer (hereafter r#f«rr«d to at "Seller"), subject to 
•ft tarmt. condition!, warrantee and agreements contained herein, including those printed on the reverM $ide hereof 
xl \mi MM) UrVf=*> sows 3$0 i)L OOY TYPf _ . ICYL COIOH / 4-7*.5<l\ C J ^ / ^ ^ 
YJDbcBM bihrsse-sm + 7.007. 
STOCK NO 
77- 3 4 ; fW-77 
SALESPCaSON 
XA 
PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
1. CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE 
2. ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS M 3- VAU**-* ~ ^V4**1 &<-?$+ 
"A — < / < 4<>i L ?*/ tf -*4± I -24V £ 
rk ?&, 
6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5) 4 YG4pt\ 
7. MFR. REBATE 
8. PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE . 
9. SUBTOTAL (line 6 minus 8) 
•»4<J 
?\&Q\ 
THIS SECTION FOR SELLERS USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRAOE-IN 
• Title (il not. explain): 
MflKHtAnoM ti l l 
Of S*lf 
—-*5wTl 
or AnowifY STAT€MMT 
M6*MfV' AUfHflfll?AfldN 
roa f * r o F f 
rVOT/CE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide) (or this vehicle is part of this contract 
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract ol sale. 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTTXUSEO CAR BUYERS GUIDE 
* - y £ 
; J    
SU TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
YEAR/MAKE 
./) s 
OOOM6TER . . 
7 M*r> as^n/**, 3<r5GSftC 
' ; — 
FINANCING DISCLO RE 
INSTRUCTION: One of the two following disclosures, either "A" or 8". must be acknowledged. If 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing, or if this is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-in only 
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A". If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then both 
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure ~B" BY SIGNING. PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE 
HAS REAO THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING (DISCLOSURE " B " , DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN. 
V.tN /W<. 
•BALANCE OWED ON THA OE-IN: 
^IjJSAAtKl Z5*Q 
BALANCE OWED TO: 
AODRESS: 
PAYOFF 
VERIFIED BY: 
GOOD 
UNTIL 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
•(A)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 0ESCRI8E0 IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL-
EDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MAOE NO PROMISES. WARRANTIES. 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGAAOING SELLERS ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE 
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE FURTHERMORE. PURCHASER UNOERSTANOS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN OROER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE P^MENT-
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON-
SIBILITY OF THE PURCHASER y^ ' \ I 
DATE OF 
VERIFICATION: A C C . » : 
•WARRANTY AS T O BALANCE O W E D O N T R A D E D - I N VEHICLE: 
Purchaser warrant* that ha/ aha haa given Sailer a true pay-off amount on any 
vehicle traded In, and that if it is not correct and is greater than the amount shown 
above. Purchaser will pay the exceaa to Softer on demand 
10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE 123 
11. BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN* 
12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN (line 10 minus 11) 
13. DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit amt. line 8) 
14. TOTAL CREDITS 
15. SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
(total lines 12 & 13) 
18. SERVICE CONTRACT 
17. 
18. SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS (total lines 15-17) 
19. TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10) | /6.5c) Q 
20. NET TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) s 5 o*d 
21. UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT* 
22. LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES 
23. PROPERTY TAX DUE ON TRADE-IN 
24. STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
26. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
28. 
29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 16, 21-27) 
30. TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 
31 BALANCE DUE 
0AY MONTH. . 1 9 -
(total line 29 rwnus 30) 
JU^fOO' 
lt*5Q$ 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE F/flANCING 
"(B)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 0ESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLERS REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIOE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
_% AND % PER ANNUM. TERM BETWEEN 
MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
PER MONTH BASEO 
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN 
. MONTHS AND . 
. PER MONTH ANO $ . 
4-4 67-34 
LL 
^l^oo 
rPh4}* 0 
3 0 5 5 4 
f w * ° 
.JCBZSZJESS. j m * » - 7 - -
juct 
BETWEEN $ 
ON A OOWN PAYMENT OF $ 
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS OISCLOSED. THEN 
SELLER MUST. WITHIN SEVEN CALENOAR OAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE. MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PURCHASER THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT. IF HE/SHE CHOOSES. TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE. PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401 
IN OROER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE. THE PURCHASER SHALL: 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASER 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN ORIVEN; ANO 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE. 
IN RETURN. SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHEF 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER. INCLUDING ANY OOWN PAYMENT AND ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN. !F THE TRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION. THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARO THE PURCHASE 
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRAOE-IN. AS NOTED IN THE OOCUMENT OF SALE. 
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN 
FINANCING 
SWNArUflC 
or- PurcHAsi n _ 
SKNATUftC 
Of SIUEA 
*'?!&. 34 OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: NONE^fc. AS FOLLOWS Q 
Purchaser has arranged insurance on vehicle rtwough . . insurance company. Policy I -
As is stated on tha reverse side of this document, unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing. Seller makes no Warranty, express or implied, with respect to the merchantability, 
fitness lor particular purpose, or otherwise coricerntiq the vehicle, parts or accessories described herein. Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that provided by the 
manulacturar, II any. as explained and corrtfiwied by Paragraph 4 en the reverse skJe hertof. ^ 
Purchaser agrees mat this contract includes alt ot the terms, conditions and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of 
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS REAO ITS TERMS. CONDITIONS ANO WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE ANO THE REVERSE SIOE HEREOF ANO HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT. ANO FURTHER AGREES TO PAY THE 'BALANCE 0 U F SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED 
SNNATUSf :/, /. '•fSrrtr-"/ Vf MICH TO Sf TITICO IN «AMC O f / £-—> *— rA - A i-r* 
CONDITIONS ANO WARRANTIES 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED: 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which 
have been mutually agreed upon: 
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of 
such vehicle In the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear 
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of ail liens and encumbrances except 
as otherwise noted on the reverse side hereof. 
2. If the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller 
may set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicle 
has been taken in trade. Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out 
of the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete 
the purchase. 
3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond 
the control of the Seller. 
4. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER, 
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS, 
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE 
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to 
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said used vehicle. 
6. In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, condit.or s or warranties in this agreement, Purchaser 
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing. 
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT. 
9. Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older. 
10. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security interest in the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to 
secure full payment of the purchase price. This security interest covers all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser 
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also grants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage Insurance policy 
on the vehicle. 
11. If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle is part ot this contract Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in this contract of sale. 
12. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS: 
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT, 
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE: 
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON 
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR-
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN; 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE, AND THAT 
TRANSFER OF THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS 
RIGHTFUL; AND 
0 ) THAT THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED", 
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-1a-1004 ANO 41-1a-1005 
OR STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT. IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FOR ANO PAY THE SELLER THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE AND THE REOUCEO 
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISTRATION. 
13. Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by Purchaser for the purpose of securing Seller, 
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, if any, of the warranties made in the preceding paragraph. 
14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser if mailed by ordinary mall, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address 
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deemed reasonable and effective notification. 
15. The rate of interest as set forth in the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may involve a variable rate, if therein 
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit agreement representing financing to provide the credit disclosures required by law, 
including disclosures regarding variable rates of interest. 
ADDENDUM C 
Minute Entry of October 29, 1998 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RON DREITZLER, et al 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 980900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Dreitzler's Motion For Summary Judgment and For Award 
of Attorney's Fees and Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair Inc.'s 
Motion For Summary Judgment were taken under advisement by the 
Court after the submission of oral argument and memoranda by 
counsel. Having reviewed all memoranda in support, opposition, 
reply, and supplemental thereto, the Court being fully advised 
comes now and rules as follows: 
1. Defendant Dreitzler's and Werner's Mercedes Repair Inc.'s 
Motions For Summary Judgment are granted based upon & H of 
the reasons, analysis and authorities set forth in 
defendant's memoranda in support, reply and supplemental 
thereto. Defendant Drietzler's request for an award of 
attorney fees is denied. 
2. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine have been rendered moot and/or 
denied by implication based upon the ruling referenced 
hereinabove. 
3. Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order granting summary judgment 
consistent with this Minute Entry. 
Dated this day of October, 1998. 
ADDENDUM D 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order 
of February 22, 1999 
Third JudteteJ District 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
for Award of Attorney's Fees, Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, 
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff Thomas D. 
Harrison's First, Third, and Fourth Motions in Limine came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Judge Tyrone E. Medley on the 5** 
day of October, 1998, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Plaintiff 
appearing by and through his counsel, Robert B. Hansen and the 
Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Phillip W. 
Dyer. The Court heard oral argument from Messrs. Dyer and 
Hansen, requested supplementary briefing on the issue of part 
performance, took the motions under advisement, having received 
and reviewed briefing by counsel on the issue of part performance 
and issued its Minute Entry on the 29th Day of October, 1998, the 
Court hereby enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. On or about January 16, 1998, plaintiff filed his 
original Complaint in this matter seeking to enforce an alleged 
oral agreement between plaintiff and Defendant Dreitzler whereby 
Dreitzler allegedly agreed to indemnify plaintiff as to a bank 
loan with Draper Bank and Trust. That Complaint was asserted 
against Defendant Dreitzler individually and not against Werner's 
Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
2. Plaintiff's loan with Draper Bank and Trust was in the 
amount of $14,000.00 and was secured by a 1987 Mercedes 
automobile plaintiff has claimed was traded to defendants. 
3. On or about October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a 
Change in Terms agreement with Draper Bank and Trust wherein 
plaintiff agreed to pay the $14,000.00 loan over a period of two 
years. The loan remained secured by the 1987 Mercedes. 
4. On March 31, 1998, Defendant Dreitzler retained Phillip 
W. Dyer to represent him in this matter. On or about April 10, 
1998, Mr. Dyer filed a Motion to Amend seeking to assert an 
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Amended Answer that included an affirmative defense (among many 
others) that any alleged agreement was solely between plaintiff 
and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., a Utah Corporation in good 
standing• 
5. On May 13, 1998, Plaintiff's deposition was taken. At 
that time plaintiff produced two (2) items of correspondence from 
plaintiff which were addressed to Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
Both letters pre-date the filing of the Complaint, were copied to 
plaintiff's counsel, and are addressed to the corporate 
defendant, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
6. In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was aware 
he was dealing with a corporate entity (i.e., Werner's) and not 
with Dreitzler individually. 
7. In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he 
understood the distinction between a corporation and an 
individual. 
8. On May 26, 1998, prior to filing Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiff's counsel moved to dismiss Defendant 
Dreitzler as being improperly joined as a party defendant. On 
June 3, 1998, Defendant Dreitzler requested attorney's fees in 
his Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal of 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler. On June 22, 1998, Plaintiff's counsel 
withdrew his Motion to Dismiss Defendant Dreitzler. 
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9. Defendant Dreitzler has expended several thousand 
dollars defending this matter to date. 
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987 
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits." 
2. Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement 
of the parties. 
3. The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never traded 
to defendant Werner's but was taken by Werner's on a consignment 
basis. 
4. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the 
title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant 
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had in fact been 
traded to Werner's. 
5. After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were 
inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a 
"trade-in": 
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at 
issue in this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
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source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income. 
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case. 
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement. 
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred 
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following 
described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL". 
6. Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank 
and Trust revealed that neither defendants, nor Draper Bank and 
Trust, ever treated anyone but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 
Mercedes. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
1. Plaintiff's claim alleging an oral agreement to 
indemnify is barred by the statute of frauds. Specifically, the 
claim is barred both by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1998), which 
applies to any "promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another" and by § 25-5-4(1) (1998), which applies 
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to "every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed 
within one year." Further, plaintiff's claim is not taken out of 
the statute of frauds by any part performance for two reasons. 
First, the part performance doctrine is only available where the 
statute of frauds is asserted as a defense in a specific 
performance action involving real property or unique personalty. 
Second, even if the doctrine of part performance were available 
to plaintiff, plaintiff has not provided the Court with clear and 
convincing evidence showing rhat any alleged part performance is 
exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement. 
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
1. The contract before the Court is not fully integrated 
and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. Based on the parol evidence, it is 
clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded 
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times 
relevant to this matter-
DATED this day of , 199 f 
HONORABLE TYRONE E 
STRICT COURT JUDGE 
MI\E:\CUen:\Werners\Fin<Jingj of Fact 
W.58.00 
CERTIFICATE OF SAME DAY SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW res 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the following 
parties by telecopying a true and correct copy thereof addressed 
to: 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
322-1796 
on t h e 2 clay of lj2JJy^ii)-tL^l99Q. 
Mf\l{t(Lj^ \^A(JU^4U^^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
. 1998. £covf(-~ 
day of 
My Commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
PHILLIP DYER 
138 So. Main St . Sta. 31« 
Salt talcs City. Utah 94101 
My Commission Exp«M 
February 14. 2000 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 2 tCC3 
SALT OUNTY 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER Deputy citric 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DENYING DEFENDANT DREITZLER'S 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
ORDER 
Based upon the arguments of the parties, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and 
plaintiff's entire Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice 
And on the merits. 
2. Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees is 
denied. 
3. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine are rendered moot and/or 
denied by implication based upon the Court's granting defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this J^'^' day of \/l)£s&~~ , 1991 
THE HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDj 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE V/-......--;^. 
mI\E:\Clicm\Wcmcrs\Orderrc:MSJ 
W158.00 
ADDENDUM E 
Minute Entry of April 29, 1999 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 980900524 
vs. : 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S I 
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC., 
: 
Defendants• 
: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim 
and Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant to Section 78-27-
56, Utah Code Ann., are submitted to the Court for decision 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having reviewed all Memoranda in support, 
opposition, and in response thereto, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Counterclaim is granted, based upon the analysis and authorities 
set forth in defendant's Memoranda in support and reply thereto. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., is denied. Despite the fact 
that the Court was unable to locate a timely filed Memorandum in 
Opposition, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff's defense on 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. 
HARRISON V. DREITZLER PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
3. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare Findings, 
Conclusions and an Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 
4-504(2). 
Dated thi .day of April, 1999. 
El 
NE E. MEDLEY 
ICT COURT JUDGE 
4<^0F/,T 
<2* 
HARRISON V. DREITZLER PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this, .day of April, 
1999: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Kevin C. Timken 
Attorneys for Defendants 
136 S. Main, Suite 221 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
5^ °v<-
ADDENDUM F 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Initial Appeal 
of May 4, 1999 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
S38- 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 322-1796 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Thomas D. Harrison 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
Defendants and Appellees 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Case No. 990255-SC 
The parties hereto have agreed upon the sum of $728.68 (Seven Hundred Twenty Eight 
Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents) to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendants as damages as a condition of 
a voluntary dismissal of this appeal, and said sum having been paid, it is hereby stipulated that this 
appeal should be dismissed in accordance with Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedures, and also that the following order should be signed and entered accordingly. 
Dated this ?<-day of May, 1999. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellees 
ADDENDUM G 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order 
of July 14, 1999 
FIUO DISTRICT C3i
 i ; j 
Third Judicfa! Disi ;«t 
JUL 1 4 1320 
UGL. 
OaputyC-,.-
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plainriff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S ] 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., ) 
Defendants. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: 
) DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES 
) REPAIR, INC.'S, MOTION FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
\ FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's) Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorney's Fees were 
submitted for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for Decision 
dated April 19, 1999. The Court having reviewed Werner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of that Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to that Motion, and Werner's 
Reply Memorandum in Further Support of that Motion, as well as 
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Werner's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion, issued a Minute 
Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending 
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes 
and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987 
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits." 
2. Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement 
of the parties. 
3. The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never 
traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by 
Werner's on a consignment basis. 
4. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the 
title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant 
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been 
traded to Werner's. 
5. After the dare of the contract, plaintiff's actions were 
inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a 
"trade-in": 
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper iBank and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
314,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at 
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issue in this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
source of repayment was to be Mr, Harrison's personal income. 
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
secured in part by the 19 87 Mercedes at issue in this case. 
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement. 
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred 
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following 
described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL". 
6. Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank 
and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither 
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone 
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes. 
7. When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment 
basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due 
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 1991 Mercedes. Defendant 
Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on 
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales 
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase 
of the 1991 Mercedes. 
8. Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a 
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timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that 
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The contract before the Court is not fully integrated 
and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. Based on the parol evidence, it is 
clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded 
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times 
relevant to this matter. 
2. Because Werner's was forced to pay 5878.16 in additional 
sales tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991 
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against 
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16. 
3. Defendant Werner1s Motion for Attorney's Fees should be 
denied. 
DATED this n day of ^ y F ^ V 1999. 
M!VE.\Cienr. Werners' -.Findings of Fact 2 W158 00 
s^U^(L 
IE filfcNORABLE TYRONE E 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
IMAGED 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 DATE 
« « 0 DISTRICT COURT 
JUL / 4 1999 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUQGK'-ifN'S 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, 
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
and 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S 
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
ORDER 
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's), 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees is .denied. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16. 
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the 
judgment rate of 6.513%. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE 
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN 
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
DATED this /y day of V ? ^ ^ , 1999, 
IONORABLE TYRONE E 
COURT JUDGE 
MI\E:\Client\Wemeis\Orderre:MSJ: 
W158.00 
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ADDENDUM H 
Docketing Statement of August 3, 1999 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 - 18* Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 322-1796 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Thomas D. Harrison 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. -
Defendants and Appellees : 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. 
1. Date of entry of order appealed from: July 14, 1999. 
2. Nature of post judgement motion(s) and date(s) filed: None. 
3. Date and effect of order(s) disposing of post judgement motion(s): None. 
4. Date of filing of notice of appeal: July 26, 1999. 
5. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 10-
2-2(j) Utah Annotated 1953, as amended. 
6. Name of the trial court: District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
7. Statement o f facts: 
Plaintiff purchased from Defendant Ron Dreitzler, President of Defendant Warner's 
Mercedes Repair, a 1991 Mercedes Benz 350-SDL automobile pursuant to a Contract of Sale 
dated August 1, 1997. 
Said Contract of Sale provided for a vehicle purchase price of $21,500.00, together with 
Sales Tax and fees of $469.34, for a total sales price of $21,969.34. Said Contract of Sale further 
provided for vehicle trade-in credits to Plaintiff of $16,500.00 for two vehicles Plaintiff traded in 
to Defendants as part of the purchase price, to wit: a 1989 Dodge Grand Caravan van for 
$2,500.00, and a 1987 Mercedes Benz 300-SDL for $14,000.00. The additional amount due 
Defendants under the Contract of Sale, of $5,469.34, was paid by Plaintiff to Defendants in three 
personal checks totaling $5,469.34. 
As a part of the sales transaction, Plaintiff obtained in his own name, for Defendants use, 
a $ 14,000.00 flooring loan from Draper Bank, as Defendant Ron Dreitzler had been unable to 
obtain a flooring loan on the 1987 Mercedes trade-in from his own bank, Zion's Bank, and he 
needed Plaintiffs flooring loan in order to accept Plaintiffs Mercedes as a trade-in, as 
subsequently spelled out in the Contract of Sale dated August 1,1997, without adversely 
affecting his business cash flow. Accordingly, Defendant Ron Dreitzler had verbally agreed to 
pay back said Draper Bank flooring loan immediately upon his sale of the 1987 Mercedes 
Plaintiff had traded in. 
Four months after the sale, Defendant Ron Dreitzler advised Plaintiff by telephone that he 
could not sell the 1987 Mercedes trade-in for the $14,000.00 trade-in allowance he had granted 
Plaintiff in the said August 1, 1997, Contract of Sale, and accordingly asked Plaintiff to take less 
money. Plaintiff responded to Defendant Ron Dreitzler that the 1987 Mercedes was not his 
vehicle any more, that it belonged to Defendants as spelled out in the said Contract of Sale. 
Plaintiff's only concern was that Defendants pay the Draper Bank flooring loan in full, which 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler had agreed to do as soon as he sold the 1987 Mercedes trade-in vehicle. 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler responded by parking said Mercedes trade-in vehicle in the Draper Bank 
parking lot and then telling Plaintiff that the sale had really been a consignment sale of the 1987 
Mercedes and not a trade-in sale as spelled out in the Contract of Sale. No consignment 
agreement was ever discussed, or executed, as required by law before any dealer can legally drive 
a consigned vehicle. Defendant Ron Dreitzler then refused to pay off any of the Draper Bank 
flooring loan or loan interest. 
As a result of Defendant Ron Dreitzler not paying back the Draper Bank flooring loan that 
Plaintiff had previously provided for him, Plaintiff has paid $14,000.00 too much on the August 1, 
1997 Contract of Sale, and is entitled to a $14,000.00 refund together with interest, attorneys fees 
and costs. 
8. Issues for review and standard for review: 
Issues: (1) Whether the Court's determination that there are no genuine issues of a 
material fact that exist, is correct, (2) Whether defendants are entitled to a 
judgement as a matter of law, (3) Whether any consignment to an automobile 
dealer must be in writing to be enforceable under UCA, Section 41-3-801 et seq, 
under the facts in this case. 
Standard of review correctness see Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Dixie Power and 
Water, Inc. 789 P.2d 24 (IJtah, 1990), Republic Group 883 P.2d at 288-89, Oquirrh Assoc. 
v. First National Leasing Company 888 P.2d 659, 662 (UtahApp. 1994), HolbrookCo. v. 
Adams 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). 
On the issue of Standard of Review in summary judgement cases, this Court said in Hardy 
v. Prudential Insurance Co. Of America 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988): 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material 
issue of feet, we must reverse the trial court's determination 
and remand to the trial court on that issue. Atlas, 737 P. 2d 
at 229; Denison, 748 P. 2d at 590. Courts cannot weigh 
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgement 
motion. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740? 2d 
1304, 1308 (Utah 1987), Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P 2d 
1155, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "It is of no moment that 
the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even 
compelling." Spor, 740 P. 2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P. 2d at 
1157. "It only takes one competent sworn statement under oath 
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of feet." W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural Resources Co., 627', P. 2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) quoting 
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
9. Determinative law: Cite determinative statues, rules and cases: Rule 56, U.R.C.P. and all 
cases cited above. 
10. Related appeal: None. 
11. Attachments: Attached to each copy of the docketing statement shall be a copy of the 
following: 
a) The judgement or order sought to be removed: Attached. 
b) Any opinions of findings: Attached 
c) All motions ffled pursuant to Rule 50 (a) and (b), 52 (b), 54 (b), and 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. None. 
d) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for filing of a notice of 
appeal: Attached and none, respectively. 
Dated this 3rd day of August, 1999 
s^U^ti-tL^^ 
Robert B. Hansen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies: 
That he served Plaintiffs Docketing Statement upon the following parties by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer 
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class 
postage prepaid thereon, on the 3rd day of August, 1999. 
Robert B. Hansen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
cbj4Lsu~4JL~~/ 
IMAGED 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
m£0DIST«JCT COURT 
™<rd Judicial Dlsirfct 
JUL I k 1999 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Or JUD3W^* S 
•7 / > \ f ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, 
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
and 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S 
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
ORDER 
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's), 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied, 
3- Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16. 
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the 
judgment rate of 6.513%. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE 
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN 
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
DATED this 4- day of , 1999. 
IONORABLE TYRONE E 
COURT JUDGE 
MP EACiJcnt\WcmcTS\0rierre:MS;2 
Wl 58.00 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)Ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES 
REPAIR, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S AND 
AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON upon the following party by placing a 
true and correct copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert B, Hansen, Esq. 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and causing the same, sealed, to be hand delivered on the 
daY o f ^ xfltX-^  / 1999. 
\QJHXXJUK k^iirt. y^r 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J/P day of 
^^j / 1999. 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires: Residing at: 
tP'/V-'Jifrif Salt Lake County, Utah 
NOT A f t / ?UBL l< f " l 
I -*>; rr-.*~''t --> •:•*• , •;;.-. .r.. &». aia • 
| X - > — S y rfr-n-ry 14. 2000 
STATE OF UTAH ^ 
FltfD DISTRICT C3i 
ThirdJudicIa! Disi ;cV* 
JUL J 4 13S3 
SAUCWCECOUNr, 
* Q£ 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., ) 
Defendants. ; 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: 
) DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES 
) REPAIR, INC.'S, MOTION FOR 
| SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
) FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'s (Werner's) Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorney's Fees were 
submitted for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for Decision 
dated April 19, 1999. The Court having reviewed Werner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of that Motion, Plaintiffs Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to that Motion, and Werner's 
Reply Memorandum in Further Support of that Motion, as well as 
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Werner's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion, issued a Minute 
Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending 
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes 
and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987 
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits." 
2. Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement 
of the parties. 
3. The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never 
traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by 
Werner's on a consignment basis. 
4. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the 
title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant 
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been 
traded to Werner's. 
5. After the dare of the contract, plaintiff's actions were 
inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a 
"trade-in": 
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper 3ank and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at 
2 
issue in this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
source of repayment was to be Mr, Harrison's personal income. 
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
secured in part by the 19 87 Mercedes at issue in this case. 
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement. 
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred 
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following 
described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL". 
6. Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank 
and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither 
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone 
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes. 
7. When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment 
basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due 
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 1991 Mercedes. Defendant 
Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on 
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales 
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase 
of the 1991 Mercedes. 
8. Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a 
3 
timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that 
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The contract before the Court is not fully integrated 
and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. Based on the parol evidence, it is 
clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded 
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times 
relevant to this matter. 
2. Because Werner's was forced to pay 5878.16 in additional 
sales tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991 
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against 
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16. 
3. Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees should be 
denied. 
DATED this 11 day of S^'V 1999, 
MI \ E:\CIien!\ Werners '.Findings of Fact 2/W158 00 
^c^^ 
iE itoNORABLE TYRONE E. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FILE* MSTIICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 91999 
8ALT LAKE COUNTY 
** A OtputyCto* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IH AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 980900524 
vs. : 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER* 8 I 
MERCEDES REPAIR, INC., 
: 
Defendants. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim 
and Motion for Award of Attorneyfs Fees pursuant to Section 78-27-
56, Utah code Ann., are submitted to the Court for decision 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having reviewed all Memoranda in support, 
opposition, and in response thereto, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Counterclaim is granted, based upon the analysis and authorities 
set forth in defendant's Memoranda in support and reply thereto. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., is denied. Despite the fact 
that the Court was unable to locate a timely filed Memorandum in 
Opposition, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff's defense on 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. 
HARRISON V. DREITZLER PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
3. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare Findings, 
Conclusions and an Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 
4-504(2). 
Dated thisC-7 daV o f April, 1999. 
L 
NE E. MEDLEY 
ICT COURT JUDGE 
,<"{-OF,;£ 
HARRISON V. DREITZLER PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this c^T^ dav of April, 
1999: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Kevin C. Timken 
Attorneys for Defendants 
136 s. Main, Suite 221 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838- 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801)322-1796 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo-
Thomas D. Harrison, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
Ron Dreitzler and Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc. 
Defendants and Appellees 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. CV 98-0900524CN 
Appellate Case No. 
Notice is hereby given that Thomas D. Harrison appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
Final Order granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement, of the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, entered in the above-entitled case on July 14,1999. 
The appeal is taken from the Whole of the Order. 
\Ce>-L^s3r teD r ^ ^ - ^ - ^ g n ^ ^ 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies: 
That he served Plaintiff's SMriHIiHplMBtttft upon the following parties by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer 
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class 
postage prepaid thereon, on the^Bt day o6flBB^ 1999. 
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM I 
Amended Docketing Statement of August 30, 1999 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 -18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 322-1796 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Thomas D. Harrison : AMENDED DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
: (This Case has been assigned by the 
Plaintiff and Appellant : Supreme Court to the Court of 
v. 
Ron Dreitzler and Warner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
Defendants and Appellees 
Appeals, by Order dated August 25, 
1999) 
Case No. 99-0659 
1. Date of entry of orders appealed from: July 14, 1999, and February 22, 1999. 
2. Nature of post judgement motion(s) and date(s) filed: None. 
3- Date and effect of order(s) disposing of post judgement motion(s): None. 
4. Date of filing of notice of appeal: July 26, 1999. 
5. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 10-
2-2(j) Utah Annotated 1953, as amended. 
6. Name of the trial court: District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
7. Statement of facts: 
Plaintiff purchased from Defendant Ron Dreitzler, President of Defendant Warner's 
Mercedes Repair, a 1991 Mercedes Benz 350-SDL automobile pursuant to a Contract of Sale 
dated August 1, 1997. 
Said Contract of Sale provided for a vehicle purchase price of $21,500.00, together with 
Sales Tax and fees of $469.34, for a total sales price of $21,969.34. Said Contract of Sale further 
provided for vehicle trade-in credits to Plaintiff of $16,500.00 for two vehicles Plaintiff traded in 
to Defendants as part of the purchase price, to wit: a 1989 Dodge Grand Caravan van for 
$2,500.00, and a 1987 Mercedes Benz 300-SDL for $14,000.00. The additional amount due 
Defendants under the Contract of Sale, of $5,469.34, was paid by Plaintiff to Defendants in three 
personal checks totaling $5,469.34. 
As a part of the sales transaction, Plaintiff obtained in his own name, for Defendants use, 
a $14,000.00 flooring loan from Draper Bank, as Defendant Ron Dreitzler had been unable to 
obtain a flooring loan on the 1987 Mercedes trade-in from his own bank, Zion's Bank, and he 
needed Plaintiffs flooring loan in order to accept Plaintiffs Mercedes as a trade-in, as 
subsequently spelled out in the Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, without adversely 
affectin2g his business cash flow. Accordingly, Defendant Ron Dreitzler had verbally agreed to 
pay back said Draper Bank flooring loan immediately upon his sale of the 1987 Mercedes 
Plaintiff had traded in. 
Four months after the sale, Defendant Ron Dreitzler advised Plaintiff by telephone that he 
could not sell the 1987 Mercedes trade-in for the $14,000.00 trade-in allowance he had granted 
Plaintiff in the said August 1, 1997, Contract of Sale, and accordingly asked Plaintiff to take less 
money. Plaintiff responded to Defendant Ron Dreitzler that the 1987 Mercedes was not his 
vehicle any more, that it belonged to Defendants as spelled out in the said Contract of Sale. 
Plaintiff's only concern was that Defendants pay the Draper Bank flooring loan in fiill, which 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler had agreed to do as soon as he sold the 1987 Mercedes trade-in vehicle. 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler responded by parking said Mercedes trade-in vehicle in the Draper Bank 
parking lot and then telling Plaintiff that the sale had really been a consignment sale of the 1987 
Mercedes and not a trade-in sale as spelled out in the Contract of Sale. No consignment 
agreement was ever discussed, or executed, as required by law before any dealer can legally drive 
a consigned vehicle. Defendant Ron Dreitzler then refused to pay off any of the Draper Bank 
flooring loan or loan interest. 
As a result of Defendant Ron Dreitzler not paying back the Draper Bank flooring loan that 
Plaintiff had previously provided for him, Plaintiff has paid $14,000.00 too much on the August 1, 
1997 Contract of Sale, and is entitled to a $14,000.00 refimd together with interest, attorneys fees 
and costs. 
8. Issues for review and standard for review: 
Issues: (1) Whether the Court's determination that there are no genuine issues of a 
material fact that exist, is correct, (2) Whether defendants are entitled to a 
judgement as a matter of law, (3) Whether any consignment to an automobile 
dealer must be in writing to be enforceable under UCA, Section 41-3-801 et seq, 
under the facts in this case. 
Standard of review correctness see Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Dixie Power and 
Water, Inc. 1%9 P.2d 24 (Utah, 1990), Republic Group 883 P.2d at 288-89, Oquirrh Assoc. 
v. First National Leasing Company 888 P.2d 659, 662 (UtahApp. 1994), HolbrookCo. v. 
Adams 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). 
On the issue of Standard of Review in summary judgement cases, this Court said in Hardy 
v. Prudential Insurance Co. Of America 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988): 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material 
issue of fact, we must reverse the trial court's determination 
and remand to the trial court on that issue. Atlas, 737 P. 2d 
at 229; Denison, 748 P. 2d at 590. Courts cannot weigh 
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgement 
motion. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P2d 
1304, 1308 (Utah 1987), Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P 2d 
1155, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "It is of no moment that 
the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even 
compelling." Spor, 740 P. 2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P. 2d at 
1157. "It only takes one competent sworn statement under oath 
to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of fact." W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural Resources Co., 627, P. 2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) quoting 
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
Determinative law: Cite determinative statues, rules and cases: Rule 56, U.R.C.P. and all 
cases cited above. 
Related appeal: None. 
Attachments: Attached to each copy of the docketing statement shall be a copy of the 
following: 
a) The judgement or orders sought to be reviewed: Attached. 
b) Any opinions or findings: Attached 
c) All motions filed pursuant to Rule 50 (a) and (b), 52 (b), 54 (b), and 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. None. 
d) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for filing of a notice of 
appeal: Attached and none, respectively. 
Dated this 30th day of August, 1999 
Robert B. Hansen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies: 
That he served Plaintiffs Amended Docketing Statement upon the following parties by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer 
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class 
postage prepaid thereon, on the 30th day of August, 1999. 
^ KCJJ^UJ- d. P4^!UCJ^^^ 
Robert B. Hansen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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FIL.TO 
" ;t o r p" ^. en 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838-18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 322-1796 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
Thomas D. Harrison, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Ron Dreitzler and Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc. 
Defendants and Appellees 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. CV 98-0900524CN 
Appellate Case No. 
Notice is hereby given that Thomas D. Harrison appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
Final Order granting Defendants5 Motions for Summary Judgement, of the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, entered in the above-entitled case on July 14,1999. 
The appeal is taken from the Whole of the Order. 
o^t^iA^A 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Robert B. Hansen hereby certifies: 
That he served PlaintifFs S n d M a p i M t t M i K upon the following parties by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer 
Phillip W. Dyer and Kevin C. Timken, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and depositing the same, sealed, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class 
postage prepaid thereon, on the^flt day o£0M% 1999. 
Robert B* Hansen, Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILED 0ISTMCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 2 :CC3 
SALT HKE COUNTY 
sy- ^ 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER " 0«putyci*k 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Ucah 84101 
(301)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DENYING DEFENDANT DREITZLER'S 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
ORDER 
Based upon the arguments of the parties, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGE"."./ AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and 
plaintiff's entire Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice 
and on the merits. 
2. Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Attorney's Fees is 
ienied. 
3. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine are rendered moot and/or 
denied by implication based upon the Court's granting defendants 
Motions for Summary Judgment. _^p 
DATED this J^^' day of Xjl^Jf 199 
BY THE^COURT, 
-°^;> 
IORABLE TYRONE E. MEDj 
'.CT COURT JUDGE 
MI\E:\Clicnc\ WcrncrsXOrdcr rc.MSJ 
W158.00 
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| U f l DISTRICT CO'JRJ 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 2 1999 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. OYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (300 3) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Mair. Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 10 1 
(301)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S ; 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., ) 
Defendants. ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 93-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
for Award of Attorney's Fees, Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, 
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff Thomas D. 
Harrison's First, Third, and Fourth Motions in Limine came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Judge Tyrone E. Medley on the 5"" 
day of October, 1993, at the hour of 3:3C a.m., the Plaintiff 
appearing by and through his counsel, Robert B. Hansen and the 
Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Phillip w. 
Dyer. The Court heard oral argument from Messrs. Dyer and 
Hansen, requested supplementary briefing or. the issue of part 
performance, took the motions under advisement, having received 
and reviewed briefing by counsel on -he issue of part performance 
and issued its Minute Entry on the 29'n Day of October, 1993, the 
Court hereby enters its 
FINDINGS Or FACT 
A3 to Defendant Dreitzler's Motion for Summary Judcrment: 
1. On or about January 16, 1998, plaintiff filed his 
original Complaint in this matter seeking to enforce an alleged 
oral agreement between plaintiff and Defendant Dreitzler whereby 
Dreitzler allegedly agreed to indemnify plaintiff as to a bank 
loan with Draper 3ank and Trust. That Complaint was asserted 
against Defendant Dreitzler individually and not against Werner's 
Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
2. Plaintiff's loan with Draper 3ank and Trust was in the 
amount of $14,000,00 and was secured by a 1987 Mercedes 
automobile plaintiff has claimed was traded to defendants. 
3. On or about October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a 
Change in Terms agreement with Draper Bank and Trust wherein 
plaintiff agreed to pay the $14,000.00 loan over a period of two 
years. The loan remained secured by the 1937 Mercedes. 
4. On March 31, 1993, Defendant Dreitzler retained Phillip 
W. Dyer to represent him in this matter. On or about April 10, 
1993, Mr. Dyer filed a Motion to Amend seeking to assert an 
9 
Amended Answer that included an affirmative defense (among many 
others) that any alleged agreement was solely between plaintiff 
and Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc., a Utah Corporation in good 
standing. 
5. On May 13, 1993, Plaintiff's deposition was taken. At 
that time plaintiff produced two (2) items of correspondence from 
plaintiff which were addressed to Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc. 
Both letters pre-date the filing of the Complaint, were copied to 
plaintiff's counsel, and are addressed to the corporate 
defendant, Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc. 
6. In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was aware 
he was dealing with a corporate entity (i.e., Werner's) and not 
with Dreitzler individually, 
7. In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he 
understood the distinction between a corporation and an 
individual, 
8. On May 26, 1998, prior to filing Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiff's counsel moved to dismiss Defendant 
Dreitzler as being improperly joined as a party defendant. On 
June 3, 1993, Defendant Dreitzler requested attorney's fees in 
his Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal of 
Defendant Ron Dreitzler.- On June 22, 1993, Plaintiff's counsel 
withdrew his Motion to Dismiss Defendant Dreitzler. 
3 
9. Defendant Dreitsier has expended several thousand 
dollars defending this matter to date. 
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.'5 Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987 
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits." 
2. Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement 
of the parties. 
3- The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never traded 
to defendant Werner's but was taken by Werner's on a consignment 
basis. 
4. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that the 
title to x;he 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant 
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had in fact been 
traded to Werner's. 
5. After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were 
inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a 
"trade-in": 
a) On July 23, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper 3ank. and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1937 Mercedes at 
issue m this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
4 
source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income. 
Werner's was nor a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
secured in part by the 1937 Mercedes at issue in this case. 
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement. 
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred 
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following 
described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL". 
6. Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank 
and Trust revealed that neither defendants, nor Draper Bank and 
Trust, ever treated anyone but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 
Mercedes. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As to Defendant Dreitzlerrs Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff's claim alleging an oral agreement to 
indemnify is barred by the statute of frauds. Specifically, the 
claim is barred both by Uzah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2) (1993), which 
applies to any "promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another" and by § 25-5-4(1) (1993), which applies 
5 
co "every agreement that by its terns is no: to be performed 
within one year." Further, plaintiff's claim is not taken out of 
the statute of frauds by any part performance tor two reasons. 
First, the part performance doctrine is only available where the 
statute of frauds is asserted as a defense in a specific 
performance action involving real property or unique personalty. 
Second, even if the doctrine of part performance were available 
to plaintiff, plaintiff has not provided the Court with clear and 
convincing evidence showing that any alleged part performance is 
exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement. 
As to Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, Inc.15 Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
1. The contract before the Court is not fully integrated 
and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. Based on the parol evidence, it is 
clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded 
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at ail times 
relevant to this matter. 
DATED this 2^^ day of fTf Os^^ , 199^ 
ONORABLE TYRONE E 
7 COURT JUDGE 
Ml ii. Clic::: '.V-rncr; fir.Jir.£> }t ? 1:1 
' . V •:".« -A) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Phillip W. Dyer being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he 
served MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION upon the following 
parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
and mailing the same, sealed, in the United States Postal 
Service, first class postage prepaid thereon, at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the 9* day of /i^-yr^/ , 1999. if-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 7^S sL. day of 
t Q l - 9 t , 1999. , 
.arv Public \ 
\ 
My Cpmmission expires: 
\D\^nc\ 
Notary
Residing at: 0 
NOTARY PUBLld! | 
:-*.\ Kathleen J. Gm-?n-sa 
" >\ «2«5£o. ••>!:•: C>., No. $** J 
: i C-;t Ld^ - "•; Vi-.?I 0*101 
^ C l P ^ y " Decomb3f 2'3. 1 &9 
Sij**^ STATIC OF UTAH 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
/A
*4G£0 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 5 0 0 0 
fly. 
F T H ! W D / S T S ^ COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL i 4 MS 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Or J U D 3 i ^ l S 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., 
Defendants, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
WERNERrS MERCEDES REPAIR, 
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
and 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNER'S 
AND AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
ORDER 
Based upon the memoranda of the parties, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc.'s (Werner's), 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorneyrs Fees is denied. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Werner's Mercedes 
Repair, Inc., and against Thomas Harrison in the sum of $878.16. 
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid amount of the judgment at the 
judgment rate of 6.513%, 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE 
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS EXPENDED IN 
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
DATED this M day of VI^^X 1999, 
IONORABLE TYRONE E/ MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MI\E:\ClJer.r\Wern«5\OTdcrrc:MSJ2 
W158.00 
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LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
KEVIN C. TIMKEN (8003) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. , 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S j 
MERCEDES REPAIR, Inc., ) 
Defendants. ) 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: 
> DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES 
) REPAIR, INC.'S, MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
) FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Werner's Mercedes Repair, inc.'s (Werner's) Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Attorneys Fees were 
submitted for decision pursuant to Notices to Submit for Decision 
dated April 19, 1999, The Court having reviewed Werner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Werner's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of that Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to that Motion, and Werner's 
Reply Memorandum in Further Supporr of that Motion, as well as 
Werner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Werner's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion, issued a Minute 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kathleen J. Gillman being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WERNER'S MERCEDES 
REPAIR, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING WERNER1S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WERNERS AND 
AGAINST THOMAS HARRISON upon the following party by placing a 
true and correct copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and causing the same, sealed, to be hand delivered on the 
day of ALt-M 7 1999. 
JBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be: SUBS fore me this J/P day of 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires: Residing at 
c^^V^JVyi/ Salt Lake County, Utah 
KOTrtilV ?UBU<Tr i \ \ A? svsa * 
,2000 
STATE OF UTAH _„ I 
Entry dated April 29, 1999, regarding the Defendant's pending 
motions and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes 
and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant Werner's signed a Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale dated August 1, 1997, which listed a 1987 
Mercedes under the heading "Trade-in and/or Other Credits." 
2. Plaintiff's deposition testimony was that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale did not reflect the complete agreement 
of the parties* 
3. The 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case was never 
traded-in by Plaintiff to defendant Werner's but was taken by 
Werner's on a consignment basis. 
4. In his deposition testimony, plaintiff admitted that the 
title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to defendant 
Werner's as it would have been if the vehicle had, in fact, been 
traded to Werner's. 
5. After the date of the contract, plaintiff's actions were 
inconsistent with any possibility that the 1987 Mercedes was a 
"trade-in" : 
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at 
2 
issue in this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income. 
Werner's was not a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at issue in this case. 
Werner's was not a party to this Change in Terms Agreement. 
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in favor of Draper Bank and Trust in which he averred 
that he is the "bona fide registered owner of the following 
described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes Benz 300 SDL". 
6. Deposition testimony of the loan officer at Draper Bank 
and Trust, one Patty Householder, revealed that neither 
defendants, nor Draper Bank and Trust, has ever treated anyone 
but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 Mercedes. 
7. When the 1987 Mercedes did not sell on a consignment 
basis, the sum of $878.16 in additional sales tax became due 
incident to Plaintiff's purchase of the 19 91 Mercedes. Defendant 
Werner's was required to pay that additional sales tax on 
Plaintiff's behalf and is entitled to reimbursement for the sales 
taxes paid but owed by Plaintiff incident to Plaintiff's purchase 
of the 1991 Mercedes. 
8. Despite the fact that the Court was unable to locate a 
3 
timely filed Memorandum in Opposition, the Court cannot find that 
Plaintiff's defense on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now hereby 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The contract before the Court is not fully integrated 
and the Court must therefore turn to parol evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. Based on the parol evidence, it is 
clear that as a matter of law, the 1987 Mercedes was not traded 
in to defendants but has been owned by plaintiff at all times 
relevant to this matter. 
2- Because Werner's was forced to pay ?878.16 in additional 
sales, tax owed by Plaintiff incident to the purchase of the 1991 
Mercedes, Defendant Werner's is entitled to judgment against 
Plaintiff in the amount of $878.16. 
3. Defendant Werner's Motion for Attorneyrs Fees should be 
denied. 
DATED this I I day of S4l/^V 1999 
MI\£.\Ciient\ Werners \ Findings of Fact 2/W153 00 
IE HONORABLE TYRO' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l>k,"tjj ^/,iW states that he served BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE RON DREITZLER AND WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, INC. upon 
the following parties by placing two (2) true and correct copies 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, ESQ. 
838 18TH Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
and mailing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the (PS day of , 2000. 
>hillip W. Dyer, Esq. 
Kevin C. Timken, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dreitzler and 
Werner * s 
